Introduction
With the end of the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) entered into a process of evolution which basically followed two directions: (a) the strengthening of the relationship with Central and Eastern European states which has led to the launching of the Partnership for Peace initiative, 1 the accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the North Atlantic Treaty, 2 and the conclusion of later, it decided to undertake with the WEU 9 a coordinated operation directed to monitor compliance with Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757. 10 Adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, these Resolutions imposed a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons to the territory of the former Yugoslavia, 11 and comprehensive economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).
12 NATO forces were ordered to conduct surveillance, identification and reporting of maritime traffic within defined areas in international waters in the Adriatic. The patrolling did not involve any coercive military measure and came therefore within the reach of Article 41 of the Charter.
The nature of the operation changed on 18 November 1992, when the NAC, acting upon Security Council Resolution 787, 13 authorized NATO forces to halt and inspect or divert to an approved port or anchorage all vessels in order to verify compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions.
14 The German Government announced that its naval forces already engaged in the monitoring operation would not participate to any activities involving the use of force. 15 It was only on 17 December 1992, nonetheless, with naval operations well underway, that NATO officially affirmed its preparedness to support, on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with its procedures, peacekeeping operations under the authority of the 29 See Resolutions 661 and 665, adopted respectively on 6 and 25 August 1990 (13-0-2). China agreed to abstain from voting on the adoption of Resolution 665 only after obtaining the deletion of the express reference to the use of force. 30 On the occasion of the adoption of Resolution 820, China stated: 'We find it difficult to support such elements in the resolution as the invocation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, adoption of enforcement measures and the authorization of measures to strengthen and expand the existing sanctions regime against the FRY' (S.PV/3200, 18 April 1993, at 32). 31 See Lapidoth, 'Some Reflections on the Law and Practice Concerning the Imposition of Sanctions by the Security Council', 30 AVR (1992) 114, at 118. Adopted on 9 October 1992 (14-0-1). 35 See infra section 2.C. action, the Security Council pragmatically limits itself to determining the existence of a threat to international peace and security (Article 39) and invoking Chapter VII. This approach facilitates a consensus among its members and leaves that organ a wide discretion on the course of action to be taken. In the case of the Yugoslav crisisas during the Gulf crisis 29 -it permitted the Council gradually to introduce elements of enforcement typical of Article 42 in an operation originally falling within Article 41. 30 The idea of a continuum, 31 however, is misleading as the difference between an embargo and an operation of naval interdiction must be maintained. The former imposes on member states the obligation to take all measures necessary to prevent their own vessels from breaching the embargo. It does not allow them to use force against non-national vessels and therefore it does not involve any possible violation of state sovereignty. Conversely, under the second regime, the forces engaged are expressly authorized to resort to coercive measures against any vessel found in breach of the relevant Security Council resolutions, regardless of their nationality. 32 Meanwhile, at the UN-EC sponsored Conference, the belligerent parties to the Bosnian conflict agreed upon a ban on military flights over Bosnian airspace. 33 Almost immediately the NAC decided to provide the UN with the technical means necessary to monitor the Bosnian airspace. One month later, Security Council Resolution 781 established a ban on all military flights except those authorized by UNPROFOR. 34 Despite the reference in its preamble to Resolution 770, 35 several elements militate against the qualification of Resolution 781 as an exercise of Chapter VII powers. The Security Council practice unequivocally shows that all resolutions intended to impose legal obligations contain an express reference to Chapter VII. By contrast, in the case of Resolution 781, the attempt made by the United States to have the resolution Van Vlijmen, 'The Bosnian Tragedy', NAA/DSC, 1993 Reports, AK 228, NAA/DSC (93) 9, at 3, observed: 'These NATO rules of engagement stood in sharp contrast to the aggressive enforcement of the air-exclusion zones over Northern and Southern Iraq. . . In the Iraqi case -where the Security Council has not even voted to establish a flight ban -planes violating the zone can be shot down by allied aircraft without warning. Nor were the NATO planes in Bosnia authorized to bomb anti-aircraft positions or surface-to-air missile sites if the air patrol is attacked by ground fire.' 42 See Vos, supra note 19. See also the position of the Russian Federation (S/PV.3191, 31 March 1993, at 24). The only combat action took place on 28 February 1994, when four Galeb violating the no-fly zone were shot down near Banja Luka: see 88 AJIL (1994) at 524; 65 BYIL (1994) at 694. As Resolution 816 was limited to the Bosnian airspace, NATO aircraft did not enter Croatian airspace to engage the remaining two Galeb.
adopted under Chapter VII failed. 36 Additionally, during the discussion, several members declared that the ban was based on the consent given by the parties at the London Conference. 37 Some members emphasized -though rather unnecessarilythat the Security Council kept the right to take further actions to enforce the ban, resorting if necessary to military action. 38 While UNPROFOR assumed overall responsibility for the operations NATO forces -for the first time engaged in 'out-of-area' military activities -started monitoring Bosnian airspace. 39 Prompted by the frequent violations of the ban, on March 1993 the Security Council, this time acting under Chapter VII, authorized member states to take, nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, all necessary proportionate measures, including the use of force, to ensure compliance with the ban. 40 The NAC immediately decided to enforce, under the authority of the Security Council, the ban on military flights and agreed with the UN Secretary-General upon the rules of engagement as required by paragraph 5 of Resolution 816. These rules, described as particularly strict, 41 required NATO aircraft to issue a double warning before resorting to force. Due to their marginal military relevance, the enforcement operations were tolerated by the belligerent parties, and in particular by the Bosnian Serbs against which they were essentially directed.
42

B Protection of UNPROFOR Forces and the So-Called 'Safe Areas'
Before addressing the military activities carried out by NATO to protect UNPROFOR forces and the so-called 'safe areas', it is worth considering the question of 43 Adopted on 13 August 1992 (12-0-3). 44 The further aim 'to establish the conditions for the delivery' contained in the United States draft resolution was eventually deleted: see Freudenschuß, supra note 36, at 502. 45 See, in particular, the observations of India, Zimbabwe, Hungary, the United Kingdom and France, S/PV.3106, 13 August 1992, respectively at 13, 17, 32, 34 et seq and 47 et seq. 46 India pointed out that it was 'highly advisable -indeed, imperative -that the operation, which could involve the use of force, should be and should remain under the command and control of the United Nations': ibid., at 12. Zimbabwe required 'the full control and . . . accountability to the United Nations through the Security Council': ibid., at 16; while China considered the authorization contained in the resolution as 'a blank check': ibid., at 51. 47 See the documents collected in B.G. Ramcharan (ed.), The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. Official Papers (1997) 58-158. 48 See the report dated 10 September 1992 (S/24540). In the light of subsequent reports, when the Secretary-General referred to obstruction by armed persons, he had in mind 'random or unorganized attacks' and not those by the belligerent parties; see, in particular, the report dated 30 May 1995 (S/1955/444, at 9). 49 Adopted on 14 September 1992 (12-0-3). 50 For Zimbabwe, Resolution 776 was 'a wise and thoughtful escape route from the provisions of Resolution 770': S/PV.3114, 14 September 1992, at 4. See also the Indian comment, ibid., at 7. See also Freudenschuß, supra note 36, at 504; Weller, 'Peace-Keeping and Peace-Enforcement in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina', 56 ZaöRV (1996) 70, at 99. 51 See the positions of Zimbabwe, India and China, S/PV.3114, respectively at 4, 8 and 12.
humanitarian relief. With Resolution 770, 43 the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, authorized member states to take, nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements, all necessary measures to facilitate 44 the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The vague terms of Resolution 770 conceal the sharp divisions existing within the Security Council on the need for military measures, 45 or the degree of control over the operations to be exercised by the Security Council. 46 At the London Conference held a week later, it clearly emerged that the international community was not prepared to intervene militarily in the conflict. 47 The UN Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a plan to implement Resolution 770 based on the enlargement of UNPROFOR through additional forces made available by a number of states. As the right to resort to force would still have been limited to self-defence, including situations in which armed persons attempted by force to prevent UN troops from carrying out their mandate, no revision of the rules of engagement already in force was considered necessary. 48 Expressly sharing the Secretary-General's approach, the Security Council adopted Resolution 776, 49 which realized a complete revirement in respect of Resolution 770.
50
Notwithstanding a rather controversial reference to operative paragraph 2 of Resolution 770, 51 Resolution 776 was not adopted under Chapter VII and was not intended to allow UNPROFOR forces -at which it was directed -to resort to armed force beyond the limits indicated by the UN Secretary-General. The UN SecretaryGeneral and the military commanders in the field systematically declared that 52 See the report dated 30 May 1995 (S/1995/444, at 9). See also McInnis, 'Peacekeeping and International Humanitarian Law', 3 International Peacekeeping (1996) 92, at 96. For the position of the UK Government, see 'Third Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee', HC Debs (1992-1993), vol. 235-I, at para. 70, and the restricted document partially reproduced in Weller, supra note 50, at 144. 53 See the report of the mission put in place by the Security Council (S/25700).
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Resolution 819, 16 April 1993 (unanimously). Subsequently, also Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac were declared 'safe areas': see Resolution 824, 6 May 1993 (unanimously).
55
French Memorandum Relative to Safe Areas, dated 19 May 1993 (S/25800, Annex).
56
Resolution 836, 4 June 1993 (13-2-0), at para. 5.
57
Resolution 836, at para. 9. UNPROFOR forces were increased with a further 7,600 troops, instead of the 34,000 requested by the UN Secretary-General. 58 See Weller, supra note 50, at 108-109. 59 See, for instance, the UN Secretary-General's report dated 9 May 1994 (S/1994/555, at 3). See also La Presle, 'La FORPRONU et le rôle de sa composante militaire. Principes pour l'usage des forces armées dans les opérations de l'ONU', in J.P. Cot (ed.), Opérations des Nations Unies. Leçons du terrain (1995) 54 With a view to stopping the territorial gains by the Bosnian Serbs and achieving a negotiated settlement of the conflict, 55 the Security Council charged UNPROFOR forces with deterring attacks on the safe areas, monitoring the ceasefire, promoting the withdrawal of military and paramilitary forces other than those of the Sarajevo government, occupying some key points on the ground, and participating in the delivery of humanitarian relief. 56 To carry out such mandate, UNPROFOR forces were authorized to take -acting in self-defence -the necessary measures including the use of force, in the event of bombardment against, or armed incursion into, the safe areas, as well as deliberate obstruction of UNPROFOR movement. 57 Although the vague wording of Resolution 836 left room for significantly different interpretations, 58 the crucial point was that UNPROFOR was not transformed into a combat force and was therefore bound to seek the consent of the belligerent parties. 59 Additionally, member states were authorized to use, nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, air power to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate. 60 However ill-defined, ambiguous and even contradictory, 61 Resolution 836 paved the way to the direct military involvement of NATO forces in the Bosnian conflict. In addition to protective air power in case of attack against UNPROFOR, 62 the NAC decided to take, under the authority of the Security Council, the necessary measures, including air strikes, to put an end to the strangulation See also 'Declaration of the Heads of State and Government', Brussels, 11 January 1994. The UN Secretary-General further specified that his decision would have been taken on the basis of a request by his Special Representative for the Former Yugoslavia, acting on a recommendation by the UNPROFOR commander (S/1994/50, at 2).
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Report dated 28 January 1994 (S/1994/94). Even if the NATO Secretary-General letter is not available, it may be argued that the NAC had already authorized NATO forces to conduct air strikes: see the text at supra notes 63 and 64. of Sarajevo and other areas. 63 It also approved the command and control arrangements for air strikes: the first use of air power was to be authorized by the UN Secretary-General, while the political authority was to be exercised by the NAC in coordination with the UN. 64 In January 1994, the UN Secretary-General introduced a distinction between the use of force to defend UNPROFOR (close air support) and that having pre-emptive or punitive character (air strikes). Referring to a letter from the NATO SecretaryGeneral, he declared himself unable to request air strikes until the NAC had expressly authorized NATO forces to launch this kind of operation. 65 Indirectly, he admitted that Resolution 836 permitted NATO forces to carry out air strikes, although this would have allegedly required a further decision by the NAC.
On 6 January 1994, in fact, the UN Secretary-General asked NATO to launch air strikes, at the request of the UN, against artillery or mortar positions responsible for attacks against civilian targets in Sarajevo. 66 The NAC responded by ordering the Bosnian Serbs to withdraw or place under UNPROFOR control all heavy weapons located in an area within 20 kilometres of the centre of Sarajevo, by threatening to launch air strikes against heavy weapons at the disposal of any parties located within the exclusion zone after the expiration of a 10-day deadline, and by authorizing CINCSOUTH to launch air strikes as requested by the UN Secretary-General. 67 On that occasion, as well as later with regard to the decisions taken on 22 April 1994, 68 Greece dissociated her position, but did not oppose the adoption of the decision.
Protesting against the NATO ultimatum, the Russian Federation stressed the exclusive competence of the Security Council to decide on the substance of a settlement of the Bosnian conflict and urged the UN Secretary-General to consult the members of the Security Council before requesting the use of air power. 69 On 18 February 1994, the FRY filed an application before the International Court of Justice requesting the Court to give a judgment on the alleged violations by NATO members According to Vos, supra note 19, at 10, the Bosnian Serbs 'sensing the emptiness of the threat and conscious that they -the victors -now had more to gain by talking than further conquest . . . undertook a militarily meaningless retreat from Mount Izman'. Ibid., in particular paras 8 and 9.
of Articles 2(4) and 53(1) of the Charter. 70 In conformity with Article 38(5) of the Rules of Court, however, the application was not entered in the General List as none of NATO member states accepted the Court's jurisdiction.
The overwhelming majority of UN members approved or acquiesced in the NATO ultimatum, which France described as falling 'squarely within the framework of Security Council Resolution 824 (1993) and 836 (1993). . . Indeed, the lifting of the siege from those areas -Sarajevo in particular -is the purpose of those resolutions, which, inter alia, authorized UNPROFOR to use force, including air power, in fulfilling its mandate. Hence, there is no need for these decisions of the North Atlantic Council to be submitted to the Security Council for any further decision.' 71 In any event, the Bosnian Serbs eventually complied with the NATO ultimatum.
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On 10 and 11 April 1994, NATO forces, responding to a request by the UN, executed two close air support missions against Bosnian Serb targets located around Gorazde. The action was justified under Resolutions 836 and 844 as necessary to protect UNPROFOR forces from tank and artillery fire. 73 Successively, the UN Secretary-General urged NATO to extend to the remaining safe areas the authorization granted to CINCSOUTH to launch air strikes to protect Sarajevo, 74 while the Security Council ordered the Bosnian Serbs to withdraw from the Gorazde area.
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Noting Resolution 913, but not expressly basing its action upon it, the NAC issued an ultimatum similar to that tested in Sarajevo two months earlier. 76 With a separate decision, the NAC established a 'military exclusion zone' around Gorazde and the remaining safe areas and authorized, with immediate effect, NATO forces to conduct air strikes to stop any Bosnian Serb attacks involving heavy weapons against the safe areas. 77 The procedural arrangements were updated in order to allow not only the UN but also NATO to recommend the initiation of air strikes.
In spite of the apparent confirmation of the existing legal framework, NAC decisions seem to put the cooperation between NATO and the UN at the level of UNPROFOR and NATO commanders, thus undermining the role of the UN Secretary-General and the Security Council. 78 Equally important, the NAC assigned to the NATO military authority the exclusive responsibility for assessing when the mission was to be 79 Ibid., at para. 9(e). 80 Ibid., at para. 9(d). 81 See L. Silber and A. Little, The Death of Yugoslavia (1996) 79 and made an ambiguous reference to some additional measures it could have authorized upon a request channelled through the NATO chain of command.
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The firm NATO approach, clearly aimed at overcoming the reluctance of the UN Secretary-General and his delegates to authorize the use of force, inevitably provoked a growing rift between NATO and the UN, as well as among their respective member states. 81 In the following months, nonetheless, NATO forces conducted only the air strikes -all of marginal if not symbolic military importance -expressly authorized by the UN Secretary-General or his delegates.
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The enforcement of the protection of the safe areas was bound to failure due to the serious shortcomings of the concept of safe areas and, more generally, of the peacekeeping operation underway in Bosnia and Croatia. The UN Secretary-General accurately observed that 'the general imposition and stricter enforcement of exclusion zones around the safe areas in order to influence the outcome of the conflict . . . would change the nature of the UN presence in the area and imply unacceptable risks for UNPROFOR. In both cases the result would be a fundamental shift from the logic of peacekeeping to the logic of war and would require the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia and Herzegovina.'
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C The Operation Deliberate Force
In summer 1995, when a detailed plan to evacuate UNPROFOR forces was ready to be implemented, 84 the conflict registered a series of new dramatic events. After the Gorazde crisis, the UN Secretary-General interpreted the UNPROFOR mandate as limited to peacekeeping functions and considered a further Security Council resolution under Chapter VII indispensable to initiate military activities against any belligerent parties. In this regard, he foresaw the revision of the existing legal framework through the creation of a multinational force authorized by the Security Council and operating under the command of the contributing states. China, in particular, stated that: 'Once the force is put into operation, it is bound to become a party to the conflict, thus depriving UNPROFOR of its status as a peacekeeping force' (ibid., at 14). Similarly, see the position of the Russian Federation (ibid., at 9 et seq). authorized level of force. 86 The initiative was approved by the Security Council, 87 but provoked contrasting reactions from those states which welcomed a stronger approach to the enforcement of the existing UNPROFOR mandate, 88 and those opposing what was seen as a creeping abandonment of the peacekeeping principles. 89 Meanwhile, the Bosnian Serbs brutally entered the so-called safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa, immediately meeting Security Council condemnation. 90 At the London Conference convened following such attacks, the UN, NATO, Russia, the United States and several other states warned the Bosnia Serbs that an attack against Gorazde would have sparked a substantial and decisive military response. 91 The United States further elaborated on the statement by adding that the 'pin-prick strikes' policy would be replaced by stronger action, while the existing command and control arrangement for use of NATO air power would be significantly adjusted to ensure responsiveness and unity. 92 A few days later the NAC decided to launch extensive air strikes under the authority of existing Security Council resolutions, in the event of a Bosnian Serb attack against Gorazde. 93 Clearly departing from his own previous approach, the UN Secretary-General immediately expressed his support for the NAC decision, at the same time stressing that the 'dual-key' arrangements would remain in place. 94 These developments must be considered in the light of the changing military and political situation. In the first place, the FRY had progressively reduced its involvement in the conflict and accepted the international monitoring of its border with the Republika Srpska, 95 determined that they had achieved their aims, 105 which essentially included: (a) cessation of attacks against Sarajevo and the other safe areas; (b) withdrawal of heavy weapons from the total exclusion zone around Sarajevo; (c) complete freedom of movement for UN troops and unrestricted use of Sarajevo airport.
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On 8 September 1995, the Russian Federation requested the immediate cessation of the operations and strongly contested their legitimacy on several grounds. Due to their punitive, disproportionate and extensive nature, the operations were considered as contrary to existing Security Council resolutions which were based on the principle of proportionality 107 and limited to the defence of UNPROFOR and the safe areas. As for the procedure, the Russian Federation objected to the fact that the Security Council had not been consulted as required by Resolution 844, while the memorandum of understanding had not been made available to all the Council members. It was further argued that the arrangements substantially revised the 'dual-key' procedure, thus depriving the UN of the power to suspend or terminate the operations. The same day the Contact Group announced the conclusion of an agreement among the governments of Sarajevo, Zagreb and Belgrade, the latter also representing the Bosnian Serbs. 113 In the following week, the Bosnian Serbs agreed to comply with the conditions established by UNPROFOR and NATO commanders, thereby obtaining the cessation of Operation Deliberate Force. Meanwhile the Sarajevo government decided to put an end to the military offensive jointly undertaken with Croatian forces. The conclusion of the conflict was then formalized with the peace accords concluded in Dayton and signed in Paris. 117 Resolution 1199 adopted on 23 September 1998 (14-0-1), at para. 9. 118 S/PV.3930, 23 September 1998, at 3. 119 Ibid., at 5. 120 See the letter dated 9 October 1998, partly quoted in Simma, 'NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects', 10 EJIL (1999) 1, n. 13. 121 'Statement by the Secretary-General Following Decision on the ACTORD', Brussels, 13 October 1998.
The order put the national forces designed for the operation under the operational command of SACEUR. 122 
D The Military Intervention in Kosovo
Whereas the NATO-led multinational force deployed in accordance with the Dayton accords and Security Council Resolution 1031 115 managed to keep the fragile peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the situation in Kosovo rapidly degenerated and recorded massive violations of human rights. The Security Council reacted by condemning the use of excessive force by the Serb forces as well as the terrorist acts perpetrated by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), by calling upon the parties to reach a political solution of the crisis, and by imposing an arms embargo. 116 Successively, it qualified the situation as a threat to peace and security in the region and ordered the Belgrade government to withdraw the security forces used for the civilian repression, to facilitate the humanitarian relief, and to permit an effective international monitoring of the compliance of the obligations imposed upon the parties. Member states were urged to provide the human and technical resources for the monitoring mission.
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The brief debate within the Security Council reveals the significantly divergent interpretations given to the resolution. The Russian Federation emphasized that despite the reference to Chapter VII no use of force was contemplated, 118 whereas the United States announced that NATO was planning military operations to guarantee, if necessary, compliance with the resolution.
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A couple of weeks later, the NATO Secretary-General declared that, although the adoption by the Security Council of a further resolution clearly authorizing an enforcement action was unlikely, the Alliance could legitimately resort to force to put an end to the humanitarian catastrophe and ensure compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions. 120 On 13 October 1998, the NAC issued an activation order for limited air strikes and a phased air campaign in the FRY.
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The military threat pushed the Belgrade government to sign two agreements. The first agreement, concluded with the OSCE, established the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) which was charged with monitoring compliance with Security Council Resolution 1199. 122 The KVM would have operated on an entirely consensual basis and would not have been allowed to enforce compliance, respond to local 123 'KVM Agreement Between NATO and the FRY', Belgrade, 15 October 1999, in S/1998/991 Annex. 124 Resolution 1203, adopted on 24 October 1998 (13-0-2), at para. 9. 125 S/PV.3937, 24 October 1998, at 12. 126 Ibid., at 14. See also the criticism expressed by Costa Rica, ibid., at 6; and Brazil, ibid., at 10. 127 Ibid., respectively at 13 and 15. 128 disturbances or react to hostilities or enforce access by relief organizations. Relying on Article 7, which obliged the FRY to permit and cooperate in the evacuation of KVM members caught in emergency situation, NATO placed a rescue force in the Republic of Macedonia. The second agreement, concluded with NATO, on the occasion represented by Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), established a NATO air surveillance mission over Kosovo and defined the main technical aspects of the operation, and also included a rather obscure article on 'Force Protection' according to which violations of the agreement would have been 'immediately arbitrated through bilateral channels to determine liability and appropriate action to be taken'.
123
The Security Council rapidly endorsed both agreements and confirmed that, in the event of an emergency situation, action may be needed to ensure the safety of the OSCE personnel involved in the monitoring mission. 124 Other references to the use of force included in the draft resolution were deleted in order to avoid a Chinese veto. Concern over the NATO military threat was expressed by the Russian Federation, which urged NATO to abstain from taking unilateral action and to withdraw the activation order. 125 China qualified the NATO initiative as contrary to the Charter and general international law. 126 The United Kingdom and the United States, in turn, underlined the need to take concrete action to ensure the effective compliance with Security Council resolutions, and ultimately to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. 127 Adopting a more prudent approach, France affirmed the centrality of the Security Council in the field of use of force and considered Resolution 1203 as necessary to legitimate the accords signed by the FRY.
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Despite the intense diplomatic activities by the EU, the United States and the Contact Group, the crisis degenerated further. On 19 January 1999, the Security Council condemned, through a Presidential statement, the attitude of the Belgrade government as contrary to its resolutions and the relevant agreements. 129 On 28 January 1999, the NAC did not rule out any measure that would have ensured full respect for the demands of the international community and the observance of all relevant Security Council resolutions. 130 The following day the Contact Group called upon both sides to put an end to the violence and summoned their representatives to Rambouillet to hammer out a political settlement of the crisis. 131 The decision of the Contact Group, which did not mention the NATO threat to use force, immediately found the support of the Security Council. 132 On 30 January 1999, the NAC gave the NATO SecretaryGeneral the power to authorize air strikes against targets in the FRY territory. 133 The FRY participated in the negotiation -not without protesting against the NATO threat to resort to force, considered as a violation of Article 53 of the Charter 134 -but refused to sign the Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo. 135 On 23 March 1999, the NATO Secretary-General directed SACEUR to initiate a broad range of air operations against the FRY.
136 Behind the rhetorical references to the support of the international community, the intervention was decided upon and executed by a limited group of states and provoked a rift among UN member states. A draft resolution submitted before the Security Council and calling for an immediate cessation of the air operations 137 gathered only the votes of the Russian Federation, China and Namibia. The debate within the Security Council witnessed a sharp division. On the one hand, the intervention was justified as necessary to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe, 138 to guarantee respect by the Belgrade government of its international obligations, 139 to protect the international personnel, to contain the flow of refugees pressing on neighbouring countries, and to prevent a further deterioration of peace and stability in the region. 140 On the other hand, NATO action was criticized by a significant number of states as contrary to Articles 2(4) and 53 of the Charter as well as to the customary norm prohibiting the use of force in international relations. It was made abundantly clear that no coercive action could be undertaken by states or 141 See, in particular, the intervention of the Russian Federation, China, RFY, India, Cuba, S/PV. 3988 Meanwhile, at the end of April 1999, the FRY instituted before the International Court of Justice separate proceedings against 10 NATO member states on the basis of Article IX of the Genocide Convention and Article 38(5) of the Rules of the Court. The Belgrade government denounced the intervention in Kosovo as contrary, inter alia, to Articles 2(4) and 53(1) of the Charter and asked the Court to adopt some provisional measures, and specifically to order NATO to terminate immediately the air strikes and refrain from any threat or use of force. 144 On 2 June 1999, the Court rejected the request for lack of prima facie jurisdiction and dismissed the cases against the United States and Spain as manifestly ill-founded but decided to remain seised of the others. 145 The air campaign ended on 9 June 1999 after the FRY and Serbian Governments signed an agreement with NATO, again represented by SACEUR, along the lines of the general principles previously adopted by the G8. 146 The agreement established the procedures for the full withdrawal of the Yugoslav security forces from Kosovo and the deployment by the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, of a multinational force operating with a unified NATO chain of command and under the political control of the NAC, in consultation with non-NATO force contributors. The force was charged with taking any measure, including the use of force, necessary to maintain a secure environment in the province and facilitate the return of displaced peoples and refugees. 147 The Security Council immediately endorsed the agreement and authorized member states and the relevant organizations to create a multina-tional force whose responsibilities included deterring the renewal of the hostilities, maintaining and, where necessary, enforcing a ceasefire, ensuring the withdrawal of the Federal and Republic military, and demilitarizing the KLA. 148 The states which had opposed the NATO intervention welcomed the reaffirmation of the principles of the Charter, the primary responsibility of the Security Council, and the setting of clear limits to the use of force contained in the Resolution.
The General Legal Framework of, and the Main Questions Raised by, NATO Coercive Military Activities
A The Resort to Force by Regional Organizations NATO military involvement in the Yugoslav crisis could in the first place be considered as an action by the Alliance functioning as a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the Charter. 149 Leaving aside the constitutional problems that may arise within NATO member states, 150 the issue must be analyzed from two perspectives: the relationship between NATO and the Security Council, and the institutional transformation of the Alliance.
The notion of a regional organization still remains rather controversial as any attempt to define a region for the purpose of Chapter VIII is bound to failure. 151 Additionally, neither the travaux préparatoires nor the subsequent practice offer cogent criteria to distinguish regional agencies from regional arrangements. It has convincingly been argued that:
the degree of institutionalization required of regional 'arrangements or agencies' is not predetermined by the UN Charter: members of a 'region' can certainly create a full-fledged 'organization', meaning an intergovernmental organization with a separate legal personality, operating through organs of its own; but nothing prevents them from setting up a less developed 'institutional union', operating through common organs of the Member States, or even a 'simple union', operating through the (mere) cooperation of its Members. under the terms of Article 52. 154 Thus, even a simple union of states, functioning as the coordination centre for national activities carried out through common organs, may qualify as a regional organization, provided it has 'as its purpose the settlement at a regional level of matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security'. 155 Consequently, whether the organization possesses international personality is irrelevant for the applicability of the provisions of Chapter VIII. 156 Even more importantly, given the silence of Article 53 and the lack of a sufficiently consistent practice, authors are divided on whether a regional organization is entitled to carry out enforcement action against a non-member state. 157 This uncertain legal framework brought about an impressive expansion of the range of organizations potentially able to perform Chapter VIII activities. In the Agenda for Peace, in particular, the UN Secretary-General included among others 'regional organizations for the mutual security and defence, organizations for general regional development or for cooperation on a particular economic topic or function, and groups created to deal with a specific political, economic or social issue of current concern '. 158 As to the role of regional organizations in the collective security system, the 'decentralized option' envisaged in Chapter VIII of the Charter as an alternative to the enforcement action of Articles 42 et seq, includes two phases. 159 The normative phase consists in the Security Council resolution recommending or authorizing resort to 160 (1994) 54, at 57, points out that NATO is not a subcontractor to the United Nations but a sovereign organization with a duty to discuss the conditions for supporting the United Nations. As the role of the regional organization is limited to the execution of Security Council decisions and the Council itself retains an effective control over the military operations, the United Nations bears international responsibility, although subsidiary or even concurrent responsibility of regional organizations, and possibly of its member states, cannot be ruled out.
military force by the regional organization, and the decision of the regional organization offering or accepting its military involvement in the management of the crisis. If the regional organization permanently disposes of armed forces, the normative phase is followed by the operative phase directly conducted by the regional organization. Otherwise, the decision of the regional organization is vested with permissive or mandatory character according to its constituent instrument, and the enforcement action takes place only if, and insofar as the member states of the regional organization provide, on a case-by-case basis, the forces asked for or requested.
The crucial question, however, remains the conditions under which a regional organization can carry out enforcement actions pursuant to Article 53(1) of the Charter, and, in particular, what degree of control the Security Council ought to exercise over the operations. Conflicting views have been put forward in this regard, ranging from strict control, 160 which presumably implies that the Security Council envisages the start-up, supervision and termination of enforcement action, 161 to a mere authorization which, according to some authors, may even be implicit or expressed ex post facto.
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Article 53(1) introduces a twofold distinction: the utilization of regional organizations by the Security Council, and the autonomous enforcement by regional organizations acting upon a Security Council authorization.
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Under the first option, the Security Council exercises an effective control over the operations. The control necessarily includes the power to revise the objectives of the enforcement action, to assess when they are achieved, and ultimately to suspend or terminate the operations. 164 Operational command and control, and possibly strategic direction, 165 are left to the regional organization. As the UN members have no obligation to take part in enforcement action in the absence of an agreement under Article 43, a fortiori such an obligation does not exist with regard to regional organizations, which are entitled to negotiate the conditions of their possible involvement or simply decline the Security Council invitation. 167 Akehurst, supra note 157, at 214 concludes that admitting ex post facto authorization would encourage illegal acts. 168 See infra sections 3.C and 3.D. 169 When the regional organization exercises political authority and strategic direction, it also assumes international responsibility for the operations carried out, although member states may share it in accordance with the degree of integration of the forces involved. 170 Under the second option, the Security Council merely authorizes the resort to armed force following a determination on the existence of a threat to international peace and security. The view that the authorization -which is basically aimed at establishing the consent of the whole UN membership, represented by the Security Council, upon the necessity of the military action -must be given beforehand is to be preferred. 167 Unlike the case of authorization to member states, 168 enforcement by regional organizations finds its legal basis in the Charter, regardless of the degree of control the Security Council exercises beyond the review of periodic reports. 169 In any case, Article 54 imposes upon regional organizations the obligation to keep the Security Council fully informed on the activities they contemplate to undertake or have already undertaken. The general application of Article 54 to all activities carried out or planned by regional organizations has been significantly contradicted in practice, with the possible exception of the Organization of American States, to the point of rendering it obsolete.
170 When regional organizations undertake enforcement action, however, the obligation to submit periodic reports to the Security Council must be maintained, as demonstrated by the Security Council recent practice.
B The Evolution of the Alliance
With the ratification of the Washington Treaty, the Contracting Parties intended first and foremost to establish a defensive military alliance, as demonstrated by the express reference to Article 51 of the Charter embodied in Article 5 of the Treaty. Opposing views were put forward as to the possibility that the Alliance could also operate as a regional organization. 171 183 They were intentionally drafted in extremely vague terms in order to avoid any suggestions of legal engagement, nor even were they limited to compulsory consultation among member states. 184 As member states remain free to determine within the NAC the very existence of any obligations or their extent, the documents lack 'an essential condition of validity of legal instruments'. à une action future', 186 not contemplated by the 1949 Treaty, can be left aside, if it is accepted that the principle of legality -intended as the requirement of a legal basis for every action of a public body or a corporation in general -is not necessarily applicable to international organizations. 187 Member states remain 'the transaction exclusive and absolute domini', or, in other words, 'the masters of the existence, or the survival, of the duration of the treaty's rules and of any rights and duties deriving therefrom'.
188 Accordingly, nothing would have prevented NATO member states from performing activities entirely outside those included in the 1949 Treaty, but not expressly prohibited thereby, provided that the relevant NAC decisions were taken unanimously or at least without opposition. The position of the Greek Government not to concur with certain NAC decisions, but not to oppose them either, could be considered as an example of abstention. For want of any provisions in the 1949 Treaty, the admissibility of decisions taken without the participation of all members has emerged in the Alliance practice alongside the general application of the unanimity rule, originally foreseen only for the admission of new members.
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NATO military coercive activities in the Yugoslav conflicts offer some indicia of the capability of the Alliance to function as a regional organization. The forces involved were fully integrated in the Alliance military structure, 190 NATO rules of engagement and the NATO chain of command. 191 Throughout the crisis, the NAC exercised political control -up to August 1995 jointly with the Security Council -and strategic direction over the operations, while the troops were under exclusive NATO command and control. Thus, no military activity was undertaken by NATO forces without a formal decision by the NAC. As for the UN, whereas Security Council resolutions were generally addressed to member states, the attitude of the Council itself 192 and that of the Secretary-General 193 suggest that NATO was regarded as a regional organization. The Secretary-General, in particular, clearly considered the resort to force by NATO forces legitimate only within the limits set not only by the Security Council resolutions, but also by the NAC decisions. 194 This was also the way third states 195 perceived the involvement of NATO forces. Two interrelated elements, however, militate against the qualification of NATO as a regional organization: the Alliance has so far avoided defining itself as a regional organization, and has only occasionally submitted to the Security Council the periodical reports on its military activities as required for regional organizations under the terms of Article 54.
Adopting a pragmatic approach, it seems appropriate to focus on whether NATO may effectively function as a regional organization rather than whether it qualifies as such. 196 It may be argued that the Alliance has reached quite an advanced level of institutionalization and integration which certainly permits its utilization by the Security Council or its autonomous performance of enforcement activities upon a Security Council authorization.
C The Use of Force by States Authorized by the Security Council
Since both the qualification of NATO as a regional organization and the admissibility of enforcement actions carried out by regional organizations against non-member states are far from being undisputed, it is necessary to alternatively consider NATO as a coalition of states for the collective performance of national activities. In this perspective, NATO involvement in the Yugoslav crisis could represent an instance of joint use of force by UN member states authorized by the Security Council.
In the last decade, the Security Council has attempted to overcome the nonimplementation of Article 43 of the Charter by authorizing member states to adopt the necessary measures, including the use of armed force, to ensure respect for its resolutions. 198 Mainly due to the general acquiescence expressed by UN member states within and outside the Security Council, this practice has found large support in literature, although often coupled with significant reservations as to the vagueness of the legal framework, 199 the risk of marginalizing the Security Council, 200 and the unavoidable selectiveness of such types of enforcement mechanism. 201 This line of argument accepts, or at least does not object in principle, that 'the system has evolved a viable alternative, within the terms of its Charter, that permits the Council to authorize states to join in a police force ad hoc, instance by instance'. 202 To support this view, authors rely on Article 42, 203 possibly read in conjunction with Article 48 204 or Article 106, 205 solely on Article 106, 206 on 'some assumed penumbra of powers available under Chapter VII', 207 on a customary norm which have emerged, 208 or is still taking shape, 209 within the Charter, probably out of political expediency. 210 Other authors, however, object that, in the legal vacuum resulting from the non-implementation of Article 43, member states could unilaterally resort to force upon a determination by the Security Council of the existence of a threat to international peace and security. 211 The intervention is consequently governed by general international law, with member states acting either uti singuli on the basis of the state of necessity theory, 212 or uti universi to protect the fundamental values of the international community. 213 In this sense, the Security Council authorization is not directed at removing a legal hurdle 214 -namely, the prohibition to resort to armed force -but rather amount to a procedural guarantee. 215 The common feature of all these views is the paramount importance given to the question of the control exercised by the Security Council. The creation of a force permanently available to the Security Council, either through the conclusion of una tantum or ad hoc agreements under Article 43 of the Charter, 216 or even on a different basis, 217 would guarantee to that organ the political control and the strategic direction over the operations, 218 and possibly -depending on the content of the accords -the operational command over the troops. 219 During the operations, therefore, the Security Council would exercise a direct and continuous control, retain the right to revise the objectives, assess when they are achieved, and ultimately suspend or terminate the operations. Mainly for political reasons which were immediately evident after the creation of the UN 220 and which are to a large extent still valid, however, both alternatives appear rather remote. 221 The failure to implement Article 43, nonetheless, has not deprived Article 42 of any significance. 222 223 could provide a legal basis for the practice of authorization to member states to resort to armed force. 224 Article 42 in fine can be read as allowing the inclusion of activities directly carried out by member states, regardless of the conclusion of a prior agreement under Article 43, within the action taken by the Security Council. 225 It is submitted that the contribution by member states, which according to the wording of Article 42 in fine would have a complementary nature, could assume an exclusive character. At the same time, insofar as Article 42 is silent on the issue, it may be argued that the Security Council could take all necessary actions to maintain international peace and security without necessarily assuming control and command over the forces provided by member states. 226 This interpretation leads to a 'decentralized option' composed of two phases. In the normative phase, the Security Council acting under Chapter VII determines the existence of a threat to international peace and security and authorizes member states to take the measures necessary to eliminate it. In the operative phase, member states individually or jointly undertake the enforcement of the Security Council resolution. The resolution produces a permissive effect and allows -but certainly does not oblige -member states to take part in the military operations (such an obligation could derive exclusively from an agreement concluded under Article 43). As member states freely decide whether, how and for how long to participate in the enforcement mechanism, there is no guarantee of functioning. 227 In this sense, it is inaccurate to read Article 42 in conjunction with Article 48 since the latter Article relates to the power of the Security Council to exempt some member states from compliance with mandatory measures otherwise binding on all members. 228 Resolution 770 showed well how without the enforcement phase the Security Council deliberation remains a dead letter.
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D The Question of Control
If there is nothing inherently wrong with the practice of authorization, the crux of the matter remains the degree of control. The debate within the Security Council has focused on the need for an effective system of control, rather than on the admissibility of the authorization practice as such. Hence, during the debate on the military 230 The intervention involved complex questions related to the exercise of the right to collective self-defence which is not necessary to analyze here. 231 S/PV.2963, 29 November 1990, at 76. Even more radically, Yemen observed that 'the command of those forces will have nothing to do with the United Nations, although their actions will have been authorized by the Security Council': ibid., at 57. See also the positions of India, Zimbabwe and China, supra note 46. During the debate on the crisis in Somalia, Zimbabwe declared that 'in any enforcement action the United Nations must define the mandate . . . monitor and supervise its implementation . . .
[and] determine when the mandate has been fulfilled': S/PV.3145, 3 December 1992, at 7. Ecuador added that 'the Security Council is the body that will authorize start-up, continued execution and termination': ibid., at 13-14. India in turn pointed out that 'the United Nations would keep effective political command and control while leaving enough flexibility for the contributing States to retain on the ground the operational autonomy they had requested': ibid., at 51. R. Falk, 'Questioning the UN Mandate in the Gulf', IFDA Dossier (1991-1992) 81, at 82, points out that the United Nations has 'an obligation to control the definition of war goals, the means chosen to achieve them and to use its authority to impose a ceasefire'. Sarooshi, supra note 161, at 35, observes that 'the Security Council must at all times retain overall authority and control over the exercise of its delegated Chapter VII powers . . . and the competence to change the way that the delegated powers are being exercised'. 232 See supra section 3.A. 233 See Caron, 'The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council', 87 AJIL (1993) 552, at 577 et seq.
intervention against Iraq in 1991, 230 Malaysia declared: 'When the Security Council provides the authorization for countries to use force, these countries are fully accountable for their actions to the Security Council through a clear system of reporting and accountability, which is not adequately covered in Resolution 678 (1990)'.
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The suggested extensive interpretation of Article 42 cannot be stretched beyond the point at which the Security Council leaves to the states the operational control and even the strategic direction, but maintains an effective political control over the operations. Such a control necessarily includes the power to verify through the reporting system the respect for the limits set in the authorization, to assess the objectives achieved, and ultimately to suspend or put an end to the operations. The practice in question may be described as a form of utilization of member states by the Security Council comparable with that foreseen in Article 53(1) of the Charter with regard to regional organizations. 232 The voting system established by the Charter exposes the Security Council to the risk that this body cannot suspend or terminate an operation owing to the opposition of one or more permanent members, and in particular the members which are carrying out the enforcement measures (the so-called reverse veto). The problem could be overcome, it has been proposed, by including in the resolution a temporal limit to the authorization, or a provision allowing a particularly high number of members of the Security Council, without distinction between permanent and non-permanent, to suspend partly or completely the authorization. 233 Neither of the options is completely satisfactory. The first would not affect the virtually absolute unaccountability of member states until the expiration of the deadline, while the second implies a significant reduction of the veto power unlikely to be accepted by permanent members. Alternatively, the resolution providing for the authorization could allow the Security Council members, and perhaps the General Assembly, to 234 Reisman, 'The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations', 87 AJIL (1993) request during an operation the verification of the existence within the Security Council of a majority qualified to adopt a resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter. The majority could be different from that which originally voted in favour of the authorization. However unpopular, the strengthening of the veto power appears a more viable option -although not exempt from criticism -to render the control exercised by the Security Council effective.
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Without an effective control, the role of the Security Council is reduced to providing some degree of legitimization to actions unilaterally decided and carried out by member states, which are individually responsible on the international plane. 235 In this case, the Security Council authorization is downgraded to a procedural guarantee and resembles a blank cheque. 236 As the authority of the Security Council is purely formal, Article 42 ceases to be applicable. In these circumstances, the legal foundation of the enforcement action has to be looked for in general international law. This approach necessarily implies an interpretation of Article 2(4) as not embodying an absolute prohibition to the use of force. 237 At least until recently, the overwhelming opinion, solidly supported by several decisions of the International Court of Justice 238 and by UN and state practice, 239 admitted no exception to the ban on the use of forceapart from self-defence and action under Chapter VII of the Charter -regardless of the effective functioning of the system of collective security and of the objectives pursued. A more flexible and teleological interpretation of Article 2(4), however, has been gaining ground since the recent military activities in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Haiti and Liberia. 240 According to this latter view, intervention may be justified if it is genuinely aimed at putting an end to massive and widespread violations of human rights. It remains to be seen -and the burden of proof is very heavy 241 -whether state practice is sufficiently uniform to demonstrate the emergence of such a customary norm.
A thorough analysis is beyond the purpose of this paper. Suffice it to note that state practice is ambiguous and even contradictory. The relevance of Operation Provide Comfort, for instance, is undermined by the almost immediate conclusion of the Memorandum of Understanding of 18 April 1991 242 and by the serious doubt that Resolution 688 authorized the use of force. 243 Operation Restore Hope, in turn, was expressly undertaken on the premise that at the time there was in Somalia no government that could request and allow the use of force. 244 The intervention in Haiti, conversely, allegedly took place to implement the 'Governor Island Accords' upon the request of the legitimate -although not effective -government. 245 Equally interesting, Resolution 1080, authorizing a military intervention in Zaire, remained a dead letter as the local government never expressed its consent. 246 The use of force against Iraq in January 1993 was justified by the United States, the United Kingdom and France 247 as necessary to guarantee the respect of Security Council Resolution 687 248 whose violations by the Iraqi Government 249 rendered applicable the authorization to use military force included in Resolution 678. 250 The same legal grounds were invoked by the United States and the United Kingdom to 251 See, respectively, the letters sent to the Security Council, S/1998/1181 and S/1998/1182 as well as the interventions before that organ, S/PV 3955, 16 December 1998, at 5 and 9. 252 Adopted on 5 November 1998 (unanimously). In Resolution 1154, adopted on 2 March 1998 (unanimously), the Security Council warned that any violation of Resolution 678 would have the 'severest consequences' for Iraq. 253 justify the air attacks against military targets in Iraq in December 1998. 251 The UK Government, in particular, maintained that Resolution 1205, 252 which condemned the attitude of the Iraqi Government as a flagrant violation of Resolution 687, implicitly revived the authorization to use force given in Resolution 678. On both occasions, the theory of the reviviscence of Resolution 678 has been considered as legally unconvincing.
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It appears quite certain, nonetheless, that -at least until the recent intervention in Kosovo -the Security Council authorization was widely considered by the proponents of this doctrine as a procedural requirement essential to qualify the military intervention as legally admissible. 254 The procedure established on the occasion of Operation Restore Hope is illustrative. First, the United States communicated to the UN Secretary-General their availability to intervene militarily to establish a secure environment for the humanitarian relief operations. 255 Secondly, the Security Council welcomed the offer (without mentioning the United States) and, acting under Chapter VII, authorized the resort to force.
256
The authorization was intended to include not only a determination on the existence of a situation envisaged in Article 39 of the Charter, 257 but also a positive evaluation of the effectiveness -based on a costs and benefits analysis -of the 258 M. L. Forlati Picchio, 'Introduzione', in Forlati Picchio, supra note 198, at 15. According to N. Bobbio, Una guerra giusta? Sul conflitto del Golfo (1991), the existence of a threat to peace is merely a prerequisite for the decision to resort to force which should follow only as extrema ratio and provided that the remedy is not worse than the evil (what the author calls 'the ethic of responsibility'). In para. 7 of Resolution 794, supra note 256, for instance, the Security Council shared the evaluation made by the UN SecretaryGeneral that the resort to military measures under Chapter VII was necessary. 259 Forlati Picchio, supra note 198, at 32, points out that only the consent of all states, except those responsible for the threat to peace, could replace the Security Council's authorization. 260 Article 2 of the Protocol, which was never ratified, would have imposed upon states a prohibition to resort to war except in case of resistance to acts of aggression or when acting in agreement with the Council or the Assembly: in 19 AJIL Supplement (1925) 9. 261 In this sense, the Alliance may be considered as a regional organization without possessing an international personality. At the same time, especially if it is accepted that a regional organization cannot undertake enforcement activities against non-member states (see supra note 157), an organization possessing international personality may act outside the framework of Chapter VIII.
military intervention. 258 The obligation to obtain such an authorization does not derive from the UN Charter. It derives from an emerging customary norm allowing the use of military force conditional upon the approval of the Security Council. The overwhelming majority of states, but also the organs of the UN, have concurred to the emergence of such a norm and entrusted the Security Council with the determination of the conditions which may trigger the resort to force.
The Security Council authorization expresses the consent of the whole international community. 259 It permits a switch from the regime established in the Charter -based on the restriction on the use of force to cases of self-defence and enforcement actions carried out either directly by the Security Council under Chapter VII or by regional organizations under Chapter VIII -to general international law. Reminiscent of Article 2 of the 1924 Geneva Protocol, 260 the authorization mechanism guarantees a preventive control, limited to the starting phase, over the military enforcement carried out by states. Clearly, the functioning of the authorization mechanism presupposes the consent of all the permanent members of the Security Council on both the existence of a threat to peace and the military measures necessary to cope with it. The mechanism becomes ineffective as soon as one of them opposes the resort to force.
E The International Responsibility for NATO Coercive Military Activities
The question of the international responsibility for acts committed by NATO forces, which can be dealt with here only in a rather sketchy manner, is independent from the qualification of the Alliance as a regional organization for the purposes of Chapter VIII.
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The personality of international organizations derives, similarly to that of states, from the effective capacity to enter into relations with other members of the 262 174, at 179. 266 See I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (5th ed., 1998) at 678-680. 267 See supra, respectively, text and notes 104 et seq, 123 and 146 et seq. 268 The International Law Commission has noted that 'it is not always sure that the actions of an organ of an international organization acting in that capacity will always be purely and simply attributed to the international organization as such rather than, in appropriate circumstances, to the 270 See the intervention by the United States, France and the United Kingdom, ibid., respectively at 3, 4, and 7.
international community and thus is not functionally limited. 262 A disposition embodied in the constituent instrument declaring the international personality of the organization is neither necessary nor sufficient. On the contrary, the question requires an objective assessment 263 of the capacity to possess international rights and duties 264 which implies the capacity to bring and to respond to international claims.
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However difficult it may be to establish when an international organization becomes a legal entity distinct from member states, the crucial test is the exercise, based on an autonomous decision-making process, of powers not limited to the national systems of one or more member states.
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When the unanimity rule is strictly observed, as it is in the case of NATO, the distinction between a union of states having common organs expressing the identical will of participating states and an organization having distinct legal personality may become evanescent. In particular, on the occasion of the negotiation and conclusion of the accords with the UNPROFOR commander and the FRY Government, 267 NATO military authorities could have been acting either as common organs of member states -even if it is accepted that the Alliance possesses the legal personality 268 -or as the organ of the Alliance.
Particularly interesting are the events related to the accidental NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade on 7 May 1999. Before the Security Council, China considered NATO as responsible for the bombing, 269 while NATO immediately expressed its regrets and opened an investigation on the matter. 270 In the following months, however, the United States (the state to whom the aircraft involved belonged) and China entered into bilateral negotiations. The offer of immediate ex gratia payments to the victims made by the United States 271 was finalized on 16 December 1999 when the two states signed an agreement providing for a US$28million compensation damages in favour of China. 272 Through the agreement, the United States assumed the responsibility for the acts performed by their military force involved in the NATO operations although it did not admit any violation of international law.
The episode strongly militates against the attribution of international personality to NATO. The assumption of international responsibility, or, conversely, the bringing of international claims, by an international organization are the most reliable, if not the only, proof of its enjoyment of legal personality distinct from those of the member states. 273 For the time being, NATO remains an institutional union acting through common organs. Accordingly, each member state bears international responsibility for the acts committed by its forces engaged in NATO operations and may respond to allegation of violations of international law submitted by other subjects before the International Court of Justice or other international tribunals.
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F The Naval Interdiction and the No-Fly Zone
Starting with the measures aimed at containing the Yugoslav conflicts, the operations of naval and air interdiction were carried out within the limits set by the relevant Security Council resolutions, including respect for the proportionality principle, the obligation to report periodically to the Security Council, and, with regard to Operation Deny Fly, the obligation to agree with the Secretary-General upon the rules of engagement. 275 The NAC exercised exclusive political and strategic control over the operations, while the forces were put under the operational command of the NATO commanders according to the NATO chain of command. Although the relevant Security Council resolutions were systematically indicated as the exclusive legal bases of the military operations, 276 the Security Council control was limited to the initial phase, namely, the determination of the existence of a threat to peace and the authorization to use armed force. During the operations the opposition of one or more permanent members would have prevented the Security Council from revising the objectives of the operations or suspending them. 277 See supra sections 3.C and 3.D. 278 See supra text and note 216. 279 See supra notes 167 et seq.
If NATO is considered as a coalition of states, then the two-stage authorization practice described above takes place: the normative phase consisting of the Security Council authorization and having permissive character is followed by the operative phase coordinated and collectively performed by NATO member states under the umbrella of the Alliance. Due to the lack of effective control by the Security Council, the operations represent a significant case of the use of force by a group of states based on general international law with the initial approval of the Security Council. 277 The relevance of this case as proof of opinio juris is amplified by the fact that during the operations no state challenged the operations on legal or political grounds.
Alternatively, it could be argued that NATO functioned as a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the Charter. The implementation of NAC decisions, which completed the normative phase, was conditioned upon the willingness of NATO member states to assign armed forces to the organization. This practice recalls the una tantum accords states may conclude under Article 43 278 and was exposed to the risk of withdrawal ad nutum. Considering that, after the adoption of the relevant resolutions, the role of the Security Council was limited to the analysis of the periodic reports submitted by NATO through the UN Secretary-General, the operations must be qualified as enforcement action by NATO upon a mere authorization of the Security Council (the second option envisaged in Article 53(1) described above).
279
G The Protection of UNPROFOR and the So-Called 'Safe Areas'
The operations carried out in Bosnia to protect UNPROFOR and the 'safe areas' are more complex since they supported the peacekeeping operation, whose operative aspects had been delegated to the UN Secretary-General. As a result, NATO operations were to be carried out not only under the authority of the Security Council, but also in cooperation with the UN Secretary-General. In these circumstances, the UN Secretary-General played a crucial role. By interpreting the rather vague mandate of UNPROFOR, he indirectly defined and revised the limits of the use of force by NATO. Besides, he exercised on behalf of the Security Council his political judgment on the opportunity of a military response each time the use of force was foreseen. This innovative solution, based on the dual-key procedure, enabled the UN to exercise a continuous and effective control over the operations. The risk of reverse veto was significantly reduced if not eliminated as the UN Secretary-General would have refrained from authorizing further military operations had a significant opposition arisen within the Security Council.
The overlapping between the peacekeeping operation and the coercive military activities proved to be rather distressing. In the words of the UN Secretary-General, 'peacekeeping and the use of force (other than self-defence) should be seen as alternative techniques and not as adjacent points on a continuum permitting easy 280 See the report dated 3 January 1995 (S/1995/1, at 9). The departure from the previous approach (see the report supra note 158) is rather significant. 281 See supra sections 3.C and 3.D. 282 See supra text at notes 167 et seq. 283 transition from one to the other'. 280 NATO enforcement action was systematically frustrated by the reluctance of the UN Secretary-General -but also of some NATO member states -to resort to force. With the possible exception of the Sarajevo ultimatum and the Gorazde decisions, NATO nonetheless accepted the authority of the Security Council and respected -however reluctantly -the dual-key procedure.
Considering NATO as a coalition of states, the two-stage authorization procedure remains unchanged, but the legal basis of the operations is different. The effective and punctual control exercised up to August 1995 by the Security Council, directly or through the UN Secretary-General, permits a description of the operation as the first and so far only instance of the utilization of member states by the Security Council in accordance with the extensive interpretation of Article 42 suggested above. 281 Similarly, if NATO is regarded as a regional organization, the control exercised by the Security Council suggests the qualification of the operations as a case of the utilization of NATO by the Security Council under the first option foreseen in Article 53(1).
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H Operation Deliberate Force
NATO's attempts to gain more independence from the UN Secretary-General and the Security Council, which so far were limited to the Sarajevo ultimatum and the decisions related to the Goradze crisis, became evident in August 1995 when the NAC unilaterally assumed entire political control over the operations. Departing from the principle of proportionality which had up to then inspired the international involvement in the crisis -and is to be considered as a general principle of the Charter 283 and of the use of force in international law 284 -Operation Deliberate Force was expressly founded on the idea of a disproportionate military reaction to an attack by the Bosnian Serbs. Such a radical transformation of the military operations, which assumed a clearly hostile nature, 285 could have been decided exclusively by the Security Council. 286 Moreover, serious doubt may be cast on the impartiality of the operation given the simultaneous military offensive by the Croatian forces substantially tolerated by the Security Council despite the strong formal condemnation. 287 Equally important, the so-called dual-key procedure operating on a case-by-case basis was replaced by an authorization valid until NATO and UNPROFOR commanders had jointly agreed upon the suspension or termination of the operations. In principle, nothing would have prevented the UN Secretary-General, to whom the Security Council had delegated the definition of the procedural arrangements, from giving an authorization of continuous character and also delegating the power to request or authorize the use of air power. What appears irreconcilable with the relevant Security Council resolutions is that, despite the lip service paid to the authority of the Security Council and the consultations with the UNPROFOR commander, the operations could not have been revised, suspended or terminated without NAC consent.
The unilateral character of Operation Deliberate Force is confirmed by the asymmetric structure of the memorandum of understanding. On the one hand, the NAC was fully operating: it authorized CINCSOUTH to negotiate the memorandum, exercised its political control over the operations, imposed the conditions for a ceasefire, and eventually suspended and terminated -jointly with the UNPROFOR commander -the operations. On the other hand, the Security Council was completely excluded to the point that only the members which were also NATO members knew the content of the memorandum of understanding. Under these conditions the Security Council could not exercise any control whatsoever over the operations. Finally, the competence of such an 'expert in mission' 288 as the UNPROFOR commander to conclude a memorandum aimed at radically transforming the nature of the international involvement in the crisis is extremely doubtful and can certainly not derive from a delegation of the UN Secretary-General. 289 The attempt made by several states, including obviously those involved in the operations, to invoke the relevant Security Council resolutions as the legal basis for Operation Deliberate Force is far from convincing. 290 Up to then, NATO member states had respectfully accepted the Security Council authority to the point that they systematically renounced taking any military action unless authorized by the UN. The 291 Quite surprisingly, given the premises, Sarooshi, supra note 161, at 262-263, concluded that Operation Deliberate Force was a legitimate exercise of the delegation by the Security Council of Chapter VII powers. 292 essence of Operation Deliberate Force, on the contrary, was its disproportionate character as well as the intentional and complete exclusion of the Security Council from the decision-making process.
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NATO operations in support of the peacekeeping operation and in protection of the safe areas performed after August 1995 ceased to be legally based on the Charter. Not only were they governed by general international law, but they brought about an evident deviation from the authorization practice. NATO used force beyond the existing authorization thus eluding the initial control of the Security Council, consisting in the authorization resolution which had up to then been considered as a prerequisite to lawful resort to force outside the circumstances expressly envisaged in the Charter.
It may be argued that the operation was the first genuine case of humanitarian intervention carried out by a group of states without a clear mandate from the Security Council. 292 If the existence of a customary norm sanctioning the right to intervene on humanitarian grounds without a Security Council resolution appears still controversial, the relevance of Operation Deliberate Force as a manifestation of opinio juris is doubtful owing to the strong Russian protests and, more importantly, to the invocation by the intervening states of the relevant Security Council resolutions as the exclusive legal basis for the operations. Even admitting the existence of such a norm, the partial and disproportionate character of the operation cast serious doubts on its conformity with the principles governing the use of force under general international law.
Similar questions arise if it is assumed that NATO functioned as a regional organization. In this case, the Security Council does not necessarily have to exercise its control beyond the preventive authorization and the review of periodical reports. What is problematic with Operation Deliberate Force is that NATO intentionally acted well beyond the existing Security Council authorization. Besides, although state practice is yet not sufficiently developed to reach a definitive conclusion on the implications of Article 54, it is clear that by no standard did NATO comply with the obligation to report to the Security Council, which would have in first place implied the transmittal of the memorandum of understanding. In these circumstances, the operation clearly finds no basis in the Charter. Quite the contrary, Article 53(1) expressly prohibits enforcement action by regional organizations without Security Council authorization. This further complicates the emergence of a customary norm allowing intervention on humanitarian grounds. Allowing states or groups of states but not regional organizations to invoke such a norm would lead to an absurd result, considering that the action of the regional organization would be submitted to a preventive control at the regional level. It appears that the eventual acceptance of such a norm would necessarily imply not only an extensive interpretation of Article 2(4) of the Charter, but also an interpretation contra legem, if not even a tacit revision, of Article 53(1).
Under both alternatives, the exclusion of the Security Council from the decisionmaking process as well as the partial and disproportionate character of the operations make the lawfulness of Operation Deliberate Force extremely precarious. The evident deviation from the authorization practice, however, was considered acceptable by the overwhelming majority of states due to its positive impact on the peace process.
I The Intervention in Kosovo
The gradual affirmation of the Alliance as an independent actor in the field of collective security and the corresponding erosion of the primacy of the Security Council therein, which characterized the Bosnian experience, were brought to the extreme in the recent crisis in Kosovo. The October 1998 agreements were deliberately obtained through a military threat 293 and may be regarded as void ab initio under the terms of Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which is unanimously considered to be declaratory of customary international law, at least as far as military coercion is concerned. 294 The Security Council manifestly lacks the competence to validate the agreements. Far from affecting the legal value of the agreements, Resolution 1203 imposed upon the FRY entirely new obligations having an identical substantive content to those included in the agreements. It rendered the illegal procurement of the agreements irrelevant and, more importantly, replaced the alleged consensual basis of the monitoring missions with a mandatory decision under Chapter VII of the Charter. Besides, although the sharp division between the members of the Security Council prevented that organ from taking any position on the legality of the NATO military threat, the strong Chinese and Russian opposition greatly reduced the relevance of the NATO initiative as a case of departure from the prohibition on the threat of force.
Resolution 1203 did not authorize the use of force with the exception of the measures necessary to rescue international monitors caught in emergency situations. The previous qualification of the Kosovo crisis as a threat to peace and security in the region and the adoption of the relevant Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII do not amount to an implicit authorization to use force. Both elements are 295 See supra text and note 258. 297 See, in particular, the position expressed by France in December 1998, supra note 128. 298 During the debate before the Security Council, the Netherlands sharply pointed out that 'the Charter is not the only source of international law': S/PV.4011, at 12. 299 See Ronzitti, supra note 295, at 480. necessary but not sufficient: such an authorization must necessarily include a positive assessment by the Security Council on the effectiveness of the military intervention. 295 Nevertheless, NATO claimed the right to enforce independently, allegedly on behalf of the international community, the relevant Security Council resolutions and when the Belgrade government refused to sign the Rambouillet accords it carried out the air strikes as threatened before and during the negotiations. Aware of the insurmountable opposition by two permanent members, NATO deliberately ignored the Security Council and unilaterally assumed entire control over the operations. The failed adoption of the draft resolution calling for the immediate cessation of the air strikes cannot be treated as an implied authorization. 296 It was precisely the impossibility of obtaining an authorization from the Security Council that pushed NATO member states to act unilaterally, thus departing from their own previous approach. 297 The question of whether NATO functioned as a coordination centre for national activities or as a regional organization lost any practical relevance as the legal basis for the intervention must necessarily be looked for in general international law.
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Considering the rather ambivalent state practice, it seems premature to affirm a right to intervene on humanitarian grounds regardless of a Security Council authorization. 299 The most relevant possible deviations from the authorization procedure concern Operation Deliberate Force and the military interventions in Iraq in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War. Operation Deliberate Force was generally tolerated, despite its precarious legitimacy, thanks to a series of concomitant factors. In first place, the existence of previous Security Council resolutions allowing the use of force permitted NATO to avoid, at least formally, a clear repudiation of the Security Council authority. Besides, the operation was limited in time and considered as necessary to avert UNPROFOR withdrawal and the risk of the unilateral lifting of the arms embargo which would have severely undermined Security Council authority. Finally, the operation was not openly directed against the sovereignty of a state.
As for the interventions in Iraq, the theory of reviviscence of Resolution 678 was aimed at safeguarding the authority of the Security Council in the field of international peace and security. Whereas the 1993 intervention was eventually tolerated by the Security Council, which met in a private session, 300 in 1998 the Russian Federation and China strongly protested against the resort to force which was described as a violation of both the Charter and general international law. 301 The Kosovo crisis had even more devastating effects since there was no previous Security Council resolutions that could have been invoked to justify the intervention. In the last few years governments and scholars were troubled by the lack of an effective control over Security Council activities, and in particular the controversial power of judicial review by the International Court of Justice. 302 They overlooked the risk that the Security Council may be blocked by the opposition of one or more permanent members.
In the early 1990s, UN member states were able to overcome the nonimplementation of Article 43 of the Charter by hammering out the authorization mechanism alternative to the enforcement action by regional organizations under Article 53. The short, and nonetheless controversial, season of intense activity of the Security Council, however, abruptly ended as soon as the common will among the permanent members faded away. Once again, the Charter reveals its main inadequacy: the use of force has been put into a straitjacket without providing any effective means to enforce the respect of international law, 303 especially when the Security Council's permanent members are unable to reach an agreement. 304 The NATO decision to elude the initial centralized control exercised until then by the Security Council disregards as inapplicable or obsolete the customary normwhose existence, however, is not yet completely undisputed -on the use of force by member states authorized by the Security Council. This brings us back to the Covenant of the League of Nations when the consent of the Council -and in particular a recommendation under Article 11 or 16 -was not a prerequisite to resort to force. The Covenant expressly permitted member states to resort to force not only against the party which did not comply with the report on the dispute unanimously adopted by the Council, but also in the event the Council had failed to adopt any report. In both cases, the restrictions embodied in Article 12 ceased to be applicable and member states were allowed to resort to force under general international law.
Unlike the Covenant, the Charter is founded on the general prohibition of the threat or use of force apart from the exceptions provided for in Article 51, Chapter VII and Chapter VIII. Consequently, it remains silent on the conditions to resort to force 305 In the case of the interventions in Iraq in 1993 and 1998, the violations of the international obligations imposed by Resolution 687 were established by the Security Council through resolutions or presidential statements: see supra notes 249 and 252. 306 The Presidential Statement of 19 January 1999, supra note 129, must be read in the light of subsequent developments. 307 308 If an analysis of the jus in bello is beyond the purposes of this paper, suffice it to note that NATO operations hardly respected the principles of necessity and proportionality which govern the use of force. See also Picone, supra note 197, at 348 et seq. 309 On this point, see Simma, supra note 120. 310 The position of D. Anzilotti, Corso di diritto internazionale (1915) at 138-139, according to whom intervention exclusively concerns actions not based on any legal norm and therefore must be assessed exclusively from a political point of view, retains intact its value. According to A. Miele, La Comunità internazionale (1997) at 40, the antinomy between the principles of non-intervention and of the protection of fundamental human rights can be overcome only through the resort to non-legal criteria. 311 See Kunz, supra note 303. 312 See Arangio-Ruiz, supra note 262.
under general international law to maintain international peace and security or to settle international disputes. In the Kosovo crisis, NATO member states tried to reduce the role of the Security Council to the determination of a threat to peace and the indication of the measures to be taken by the parties directly involved. Then, they arrogated to themselves the right to enforce the obligations deriving from the UN Charter and the Security Council resolutions. The crisis recorded a further erosion of Security Council authority, as compared with the recent interventions in Iraq, 305 as the alleged violations -however well documented -were not the object of a determination by the Security Council. 306 Leaving aside the question of the exercise by the Security Council of judicial functions -which certainly do not derive from the Charter 307 -the Kosovo intervention must be considered as contrary to both the Charter and general international law, 308 even if before intervening NATO member states made every effort to get as close as possible to legality. 309 At the same time, due to strong opposition, the contribution of the Kosovo intervention to the formation of a customary norm allowing resort to force on humanitarian grounds without the Security Council authorization remains extremely doubtful. It is certainly possible to list the conditions in which such a norm may come into existence, but for the time being the intervention can be justified only on the political plan. 310 More than indicating the legal basis of the intervention, in fact, NATO and its members emphasized the intrinsic justice of their action. Given the paralysis of the Security Council and the consequent usefulness of the notion of bellum legale, 311 unilateral intervention -in breach of the prohibition to threaten or use force -appeared to NATO member states as the only viable manner to put an end to the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo. In these conditions, the 'inorganic' structure which continues to characterize the international community 312 establish and apply objective criteria to distinguish just wars from unjust wars. 313 No differently from what happened in the past, 'justice' rests on the side of the victor as the latter is ultimately in a position to impose its own terms of settlement, regardless to the causes of the conflict. It appears difficult to disagree with the conclusion reached in 1863 by Harcourt that 'in the case of Intervention, as in that of Revolution, its essence is illegality, and its justification is its success'.
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Concluding Remarks
During the relative short span of time taken into account, the system of collective security established by the Charter recorded significant developments and deviations. With minor reservations, up to August 1995, the Security Council response to the Yugoslav crisis confirmed the recent practice of authorization to use military force. Depending on the qualification of NATO as a coalition of states or as a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the Charter, the naval operations in the Adriatic Sea and the air interception over Bosnian air space were authorized, respectively, under general international law and under Article 53(1) of the Charter.
The enforcement activities performed in Bosnia to protect UNPROFOR and the so-called safe areas, conversely, found under both alternatives a legal basis in the Charter. Due to the effective and continuous control exercised by the Security Council, NATO activities can be seen as the utilization by that organ of either a group of states under an extensive interpretation of Article 42 (probably the only instance in the Council's practice), or a regional organization under Article 53(1).
In August 1995, for the first time substantially defying the Security Council authority, NATO assumed entire control of coercive military activities and unilaterally imposed a resolution to the conflict. Under both alternatives, the operation found no legal basis in the Charter and can hardly be justified on the basis of the controversial right to intervene on humanitarian purposes under general international law. Additionally, its relevance as a manifestation of opinio juris with regard to the emergence of such a right is greatly reduced by the firm Russian opposition and the invocation by the intervening states of previous Security Council resolutions as the exclusive basis of the operations.
Three years later, the Charter provisions in the field of the maintenance of international peace and security, already stretched to the limit by the authorization practice, were openly challenged by NATO threatening and eventually launching a massive air campaign against the FRY. This meant the repudiation of the initial control exercised by the Security Council which distinguished the recent authorization practice from the regime existing under the Covenant of the League of Nations. 315 As anticipated by Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice (1991) at 126. 316 See, for instance, Charney, 'Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo', 93 AJIL (1999) 834, at 841. 317 Glennon, 'The New Interventionism', 78 Foreign Affairs (1999) 2. 318 In this regard, the documents adopted during the 1999 Washington Summit failed to throw light on the question: see Cassese, supra note 237, at 30, n. 9.
The deviation may remain an isolated case of the violation of international law deliberately aimed at overcoming the Security Council paralysis, 315 or stimulating the development of a new customary norm permitting intervention without Security Council authorization, 316 or may even lead to a wider review of the rules governing the use of force. 317 The sharp division existing within the international community, however, makes the emergence of any consensus on the issue rather unlikely. In any case, the Kosovo intervention represents the culmination of the process of erosion of the authority of the UN and could inaugurate a new phase in international relations characterized by a more liberal resort to the use of force and ultimately the imposition on recalcitrant states of some rules of international law as perceived by Western democracies.
The Alliance emerged radically changed from the crisis. Alongside the consolidation and expansion of the original defensive military alliance, NATO has claimed a prominent role in the management of a crisis outside the area defined in Article 6 of the 1949 Treaty. At the international level, nothing prevents NATO member states from assuming tasks and performing activities not foreseen in, but not prohibited by, its constituent instrument, provided the Charter and general international law are respected.
At the institutional level, the Alliance demonstrated its capacity to function not only as a sophisticated coalition of states, but also, at least potentially, as a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the Charter. Unfortunately, NATO member states have so far systematically neglected to analyze the legal consequences of these developments on the structure and nature of the Alliance. 318 The magnitude of the developments of, and the deviations from, the existing collective security system require the definition of a clearer legal framework, which will inevitably prompt a debate in the member states.
